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1. Introduction 
Mental health care has its professional and theoretical foundation in-between medicine and 
the social sciences. Its history is marked by tensions between humanism, recovery 
orientation, client-centred approaches and “being with” as principles on the one hand, and 
custodialism, instrumentalism, manualized therapy, diagnostic cultures, medical care 
delivery and biogenetic understanding on the other. In recent years, spokesmen in the field 
have promoted a so-called integrated biopsychosocial model, saying there are some genetic 
dispositions, along with individual psychology and social factors that together predict the 
development of mental disabilities. In this chapter, the content of and evidence behind such 
an integrated model will be discussed, with reference to the possibility of combining such 
varied approaches as biogenetic and humanistic understandings, the status of genetic 
research, new findings when it comes to the causes behind mental suffering and the 
historical and recent consequences of a mental health care, in which the etiology and 
understanding of the phenomena have been limited and unsure. As we know, these 
methods have historically often had fatal consequences. But also today, the reports about 
degrading, humiliating and painful experiences are numerous. Reactions to this reality 
differ between strong efforts to improve existing services and campaigns to change attitudes 
and a contrasting fundamental criticism towards the laws that govern mental health care 
and the paradigm on which the laws are built. 
2. An integrated biopsychosocial model? 
Several researchers operate with two main approaches in psychiatry or mental health care, 
e.g. medical or contextual understandings (Wampold, 2001), or psychosocial or biogenetic 
explanations (Walker & Read, 2002). These approaches do not represent distinct, exclusive 
perspectives, but instead they borrow from each other. Nevertheless, it is still possible to 
distinguish between views based on a fundamental belief which say that mental suffering 
should be understood and treated as relational/psychosocial problems, the results of 
trauma, anxiety or existential suffering related to loneliness and the loss of meaning on the 
one hand, and beliefs which say that we are approaching the discovery of a biogenetic 
foundation for illnesses with emotional or behavioural expressions on the other. Until now, 
the conclusions have been unsure. Researchers talk about “genetic predispositions” and an 
interaction between “genes and environment” (Andreassen, 2005; Caspi et al., 2003; Surtees 
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et al., 2007; Nesvåg, 2008), but cannot document the existence of biological or genetic 
markers. 
Recently, the field of epigenetics has shed some new light on the antagonism between the 
biogenetic and humanistic-contextual approaches, as epigentic studies have revealed that 
conditions outside the gene can change its genetic expression (Fosse, 2009; Getz et al., 2011). 
With both animals and human beings, relational stress and assaults seem to influence 
behaviour and brain development by changing epigenetic control mechanisms, which can 
be interpreted as support for a stronger relational and contextual orientation. 
Philosophers have pointed to the search for meaning as being genuinely imbedded in 
human nature (Bachtin, 1997; Vetlesen & Nordtvedt, 1994; Wifstad 1997). For example, 
within a bio-genetic perspective, medicalization may gain priority at the cost of helping to 
focus on existential dilemmas and search for meaning. As emphasized by Stenfeldt-Foss 
(1997), “The uncritical use of neuroleptic drugs and minor tranquilizers, instead of proper 
psychosocial and psychotherapeutic procedures, is an increasing danger in services for 
weaker groups lacking professional resources, thus threatening the patient-doctor 
relationship” (Medical Ethics and Medical Conduct, 1997, p. 14). 
As Bentall (2003) points out, it is logically possible to both believe in genetic causes and be 
human, but at the same time, it is the heritage from Kraeplin, with his hypothesis about 
clearly distinguishable groups of illnesses with their respective biogenetic reference points, 
which made possible several of the cruelties found in the history of psychiatry. The 
biogenetic reference points legitimated a strong division between “us” and “them”. 
Still, we have yet to find a tenable rationale behind this division between “us” and “them”. 
The question about what constitutes serious mental illness has no simple answer, while 
shifting trends also govern how diagnoses are developed and described. In 2011, two former 
editors of DSM (III & IV), Robert Spitzer and Allan Frances, warned against a development 
in which psychiatric diagnoses fit almost everybody, and young people can be recruited into 
the psychiatric system based on indicators that pathologize “normal” adolescent reactions 
(Angell, 2011). They referred to the National Institute of Mental Health in the US, which 
says that one-fourth of all Americans receive one psychiatric diagnosis every year. At the 
age of 32, 50% have suffered from some type of anxiety syndrome and 40% from depression. 
The former editors ask: Which numbers will we then see when these people get to the ages 
of 50, 65 or 80? This increase in diagnoses is seemingly at odds with findings from the 
comprehensive, longitudinal WHO’s multi-centre study (see among others Hopper et al., 
2007). The study started in 1966 as a large-scale, cross-cultural study conducted 
simultaneously in Columbia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, India, Nigeria, China, the Soviet 
Union, Great Britain and the US. Summing up after 25 years, the authors could state that 
people with schizophrenia recover in spite of the methodological challenges. Globally, 60% 
had recovered when the study was finished. A striking finding was that the rate of recovery 
largely varied between industrialized and developing countries, though in favour of the 
latter. The recovery rate in developing countries approached 70%, whereas it was only 20% 
in the industrialized countries. Because of these findings, it becomes urgent to understand 
mental illnesses in contexts, not only for professional and scientific reasons, but also ethical 
ones. Since the neuro concepts have become metaphors for what is human and what 
happens in our consciousness, we have some special ethical challenges (Kollek, 2004).When 
psychological and cognitive phenomena are explained as causal effects of brain chemistry, 
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human dignity, liberty and autonomy are affected. Metaphors can help facilitate 
communication, but may also carry with them some potentially dangerous conceptual 
baggage. Explaining biology (for example, somatic disease) with biology is unproblematic, 
but to explain consciousness with biology may have consequences for social interaction and 
stigma. As one example, it may now seem more opportune and legitimate to talk about bad 
genes than bad parents (Joseph, 2004), which has comprehensive consequences for stigma, 
as a biogenetic etiology has been shown to increase stigma, while a psychosocial etiology 
reduces it (Walker & Read, 2002).  
What is often called a biopsychosocial model may in practice resemble a primarily biological 
model. The implementation of psychosocial therapeutic models easily lose terrain related to 
more instrumental means. The paradox in this field lies in the lack of evidence of an etiology 
which could legitimate those instrumental means. The Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights says that: “The medical and charity model is completely 
abandoned in favor of a human rights and social model” (OHCHR, 2007). As a result of this, 
mental disabilities should be met with good relations, dialogues and the satisfaction of 
universal human, material and psychosocial needs.  
3. Definitions of otherness 
To make a division between “us” and “them” seems to be a phenomenon deeply imbedded 
in our culture. As we will also see, this division is sustained in several ways . Definitions of 
otherness are often based on special individual- and group properties, but also exist without 
such distinguishing properties. Medical, juridical, sociological and philosophical 
perspectives can be helpful in order to understand the reasons behind the definitions of 
otherness, in this case related to persons with mental disabilities.  
As previously mentioned, there has been a long-lasting belief that mental illnesses can be 
explained by some organic failure/damage. As early as the 19th century, psychiatrists 
campaigned for adding some kind of hard science to the humanistic orientation in moral 
treatment institutions and to define mental illnesses as neurological, located in the brain 
(Withaker, 2004). But still, in 2011 no biological markers can tell when mental health has 
changed into mental illness. In spite of this weak ability to distinguish different psychiatric 
diagnoses from each other and tell when illnesses arise, new diagnoses have been developed 
for the next DSM version, and new groups will be included in existing diagnoses. Diagnoses 
are also closely associated with medication, with 500,000 children in the US now taking 
some type of anti-psychotic medicines (Angell, 2011), which must necessarily be based on 
some biological/genetic explanations. Ideas about biological changes and inherited 
vulnerability still exist and contribute to the justification of special approaches to persons 
diagnosed with serious mental illnesses, as will be elaborated on in the next paragraph. 
According to Norwegian legislation, serious mental illness is a basic condition for 
involuntary confinement and treatment, and an additional condition is that the treatment is 
needed for health reasons, or that the person represents a danger to his/her own or other 
persons’ lives or physical health (Norwegian Mental Health Act 1999, § 3-3- and 4-4). These 
paragraphs invite judicial assessment, as there are large variations in both involuntary 
confinement and treatment among different geographical regions in Norway. Some regions 
have 10 times as much forced treatment than others in relation to the population (Bremnes 
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et al. 2008a+b), which in a clear way illustrates the arbitrariness in coercive treatment and 
the effects of a law that says: Forced treatment may be effectuated when it is obviously no 
use in attempting voluntary treatment, when benefits from the treatment clearly outweigh 
the disadvantages, and when the treatment is in accordance with acknowledged 
professional psychiatric methods and justified clinical practice (Norwegian Mental Health 
Act §3-3,1 and §4-4,1).  
As early as 1994, the European Council expressed concerns over the high number of 
complaints related to bad treatment, which were just within the limits of mistreatment, such 
as over-medication and the devaluation of the client’s needs (Council of Europe, 1994). The 
available knowledge about alternative approaches and treatments is highly relevant when it 
comes to a client’s legal status. The European Convention on Human Rights states that the 
“least encroaching treatment” should always be used (Palm & Ericsson, 2005; Bartlett et al., 
2007; Thune, 2008). 
Knowledge about non-infringing or less infringing treatments has existed for a long time, 
for example with the Soteria House model, with the “being with” principle as opposed to 
long-term medication (Soerensen, 1982; Bola & Mosher, 2003; Bola et al., 2006). But as long 
as concepts about otherness, as expressed in the concept of “serious mental illness”, exist in 
the law and imply a comprehensive professional power (the right to receive treatment based 
on a free and informed consent can be set aside), it has been difficult to protect mental 
health clients against degrading and infringing treatment, though now there are signs of a 
change to come. The disproportion between the arbitrariness in labelling people as seriously 
mentally ill on the one hand, and the huge consequences such diagnoses cause on the other 
has become more visible, not least with the United Nations (UN) and survivors 
organizations around the world having made a common effort to abolish discriminatory 
settlements for all disabled people (mental disabilities included), which has resulted in the 
Convention on the Rights of Peoples with Disabilities (CRPD). The convention legally took 
effect in 2008, and is an important step towards the abolition of forced institutionalization 
and treatment on the basis of disability. Its purpose is to “protect and ensure the full and 
equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedom by all persons with 
disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity” (Art. 1). The convention 
further states that “persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, 
mental, intellectual or sensory impairments” and that “persons with disabilities enjoy equal 
capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life” (Art. 12). If they require support 
in order to exercise their legal capacity, this shall be provided. Regarding health care, this 
shall be of the same quality for persons with disabilities as it is for others, “including on the 
basis of free and informed consent” (Art. 25). The convention is a sign of changes in a more 
humanistic direction, which will be further elaborated on later in the chapter. The European 
Court of Human Rights may take the lead in the process towards a more humanistic 
direction and affirm that serious infringements are not redefined as necessary treatment. 
Concepts about “otherness” related to mental health clients, in medical as well as legal 
contexts, are changing. Definitions of otherness are culturally bound, which may indicate 
that societies need a division between “us” and “them” for the sake of social integration, at 
least that is what social scientists say. With reference to Foucault (1973), Thomas Scheff 
(1999) describes how societies need excluded and stigmatized groups in order to secure the 
identity of the people inside the society. One example of this is how the big institutions in 
www.intechopen.com
 
Towards a Paradigmatic Shift in Mental Health Care? 
 
519 
France were filled with new groups in the 17th century as leprosy disappeared. Scheff’s 
analysis is important in order to understand social mechanisms on the macro level, thereby 
creating change. His deviation theories should not be seen as fatalistic statements, saying 
that there must always be excluded groups. Maybe there will, but with the help of ethics 
theory, other perspectives can also be outlined. The philosopher Emanuelle Levinas (1993) 
challenged our concepts about otherness by saying that there will always be people we 
cannot understand, and that we should accept that we cannot fully understand another 
human being. Instead of defining and categorizing (and deciding whether people belong 
“inside” or “outside”), we should accept that it is not about understanding and control, but 
about love, respect and feeling responsible. We may not be able to avoid notions about 
otherness, but it should be possible to counteract social exclusion of groups based on their 
disabilities.  
4. Degrading and painful experiences  
Even if the history of psychiatry for the most part is seen from a professional perspective, 
patients have also told and published their stories. Larsen and Andersen (2011) have studied 
psychiatric patients’ autobiographies from 1918 to 2008, and some of them talk about “a 
holy duty” when they explain their reasons for writing down and publishing their 
experiences from psychiatric care; they want to inform the community about conditions in 
the treatment system that ought to be changed. In 1925, one of the authors wrote from his 
heart that he wanted to prevent others from experiencing the same horrors and 
monstrosities he himself had endured. In the last period studied by Larsen and Andersen 
(1980-2008), there had been comprehensive reforms in the mental health service systems, as 
user involvement had become a central objective. Even so, no fundamental changes seem to 
have taken place from the patients’ points of view, although it is possible that patients’ 
experiences are not seen as being valid sources of knowledge. It could also be that patients’ 
experiences indicate that more fundamental changes in understanding and basic values are 
needed, as Larsen and Andersen ask. Ekeland (2011) has elaborated on this point of view, 
and says that the darker sides of the history of psychiatry can be understood as a result of an 
epistemological mistake; instead of acknowledging human beings’ subjectivity, 
objectification has taken place. This occurs when phenomena are created, communicated 
and interpreted by human beings (subject ontological phenomena) and treated as 
phenomena that exist independent of human beings. The phenomena studied in psychiatry 
and mental health care can hardly be counted as object ontological. In this field, we have to 
relate to cultural products and experiences picked up during dialogical processes such as 
emotions, behaviour, expectancies, hope, trust, etc. The phenomena should be 
acknowledged as human, individual and context-dependant. In order for health policy to 
take a more recovery-oriented and user-involved stance, a new foundation for research is 
needed that is based on the insight that interpretations and normative evaluations 
determine what we see and find. In this field, we cannot catch the ontology independently 
of those interpretations and evaluations.  
When human subjectivity is wrongly exposed to objectification, ethical values are also at 
risk: When the suffering person and his/her relation with him/herself or the world is 
studied by an objectifying look, there is danger afoot because we all need to support the 
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For more than 150 years, psychiatric and mental health care has been mainly based on a 
medical epistemology in which human beings are exposed to the medical glance, searching 
for medical symptoms rather than human, individual, context-related and interpreted 
phenomena. This is also mirrored in narratives about users’ experiences from psychiatric 
and mental health care over the latest 10 years (Kogstad, 2009), from which I will give some 
examples.  
The data was collected in cooperation with the national user organization in Norway, 
Mental Health Norway (MHN), which  was chosen because it is the largest user 
organization in Norway. The organization has a good relationship with the government, as 
well as a well-developed administrative system that was able to facilitate the collection of 
data. During the period of data collection, there were approximately 5,000 members 
throughout the entire country, and about 4,000 of them were chosen randomly and invited 
to take part in the study, with a response rate of nearly 20%. Out of these, 492 (151 men and 
341 women, aged 19– 90 years) also answered one or both of the open questions at the end 
of the questionnaire. These respondents have experience from all parts of the mental health 
care system, including traditional psychiatric institutions, outpatient clinics, day centres and 
individual therapy. Sixty-seven percent received a disability pension, 13% had a job and 
20% a combined disability pension with a job or studies. 
The material presented here consists of stories written in response to the question: If you 
have had a strong negative experience, would you like to describe such an event? 
Although several informants said it was too difficult to write about negative and 
humiliating experiences, 335 nevertheless wrote about such episodes. A statistical 
representation related to user organization, or mental health clients in general, cannot be 
claimed, though distribution by gender, age, disability pension, education, job, in addition 
to the fact that the informants have experience from all parts of the health care system, 
suggests that the experiences and chosen categories are applicable across many user 
categories. The narratives vary in length from one line to several pages, and the longer 
stories often give in-depth information concerning background, causes, experiences, feelings 
and concrete elements in the recovery process or the traumatic experience, although quite 
brief reports also sometime contain important information such as: “Strong, painful effects 
of Trilafon.” Out of the 335 negative stories, 267 were seen as being informative enough to 
be included in the analysis. The material is still rich and, most importantly, it is written by 
people who have first-hand knowledge of the experiences they describe. 
The 267 stories about negative experiences were divided into three main categories: 
Experienced miscommunication, rejection and humiliation, with some of the narratives from 
the categories of rejection and humiliation shown below.  
Subcategories under “rejection” were: “no treatment in institution apart from medicinal 
treatment”, “no access to treatment or institution/no follow-up after discharge”, “negative 
experiences at state welfare institutions”, “social dilemma and religious needs rejected”, 
“confidence lost because of deception”, “childhood traumas and war experiences rejected” 
and “children/family not cared about when person is committed”. All subcategories are 
illustrated in the stories: 
I was forcibly sent to the hospital because I said I felt like committing suicide. I was heavily medicated 
and had only one talk with the doctor during my entire stay. I felt I was left totally on my own, 
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together with other patients who screamed and smashed furniture. I shared a room with people who 
scared me. It was a painful experience. (woman, age 45) 
I attempted suicide in the early 1980s. I was taken to the hospital by ambulance, my stomach was 
pumped and then I was sent home by taxi, dirty and wearing only my pants. I worried a lot about 
meeting my mother and my employer. I had no one to talk to after this incident. (man, age 57) 
My GP would not accommodate my wishes when I asked for sick leave. The result was that I lost my 
job and just wanted to commit suicide. (woman, age 55) 
I got the clear feeling that the psychiatric ward did what they could to help me when I was an 
inpatient. But when problems that had been brewing underneath came to the surface and childhood 
traumas emerged, I was once again alone with no help available. (man, age 50) 
 Once when I was in my thirties, I was in the hospital. The anxiety came back and I asked if I could 
talk to a psychiatrist. I thought that at last I would be able to open up and talk about the incest I had 
experienced as a child. His answer was: It was such a long time ago and should just be forgotten. 
(woman, age 53) 
I was committed and had to leave my children, aged 2–19 years. No help was offered. I was neither 
listened to nor taken seriously, and did not get any help from the community health services. I was 
just given medicines with painful side effects. (woman, age 60) 
Subcategories under “humiliation” were: “accused and made a fool of”, “negative 
experiences with medication”, “commitment”, “forced medication”, “punishment”, “forced 
removal of medicines”, “incorrect diagnoses” and “forced sterilization”: 
I was filled with anxiety the whole night when I was put in a room on my own with a night duty 
employee who didn't talk to me, but threatened to give me an injection if I didn't calm down. 
(woman, age 44) 
I was not believed when I told them I had an adverse reaction to that special medicine. I had 
convulsions for a long period before I was given the proper antidote. (woman, age 45) 
After less than half an hour, this strange doctor concluded that I should be sent to the hospital. I 
objected and said: “It will not help.” But a person in my situation suddenly has no right to express 
herself. The doctor said: “Then it is a compulsory admission!” I objected and objected, but my voice 
did not count any longer. My husband signed the paper (after the doctor threatened that if he didn't, 
the police would do so). I don't think I have ever felt so deceived before. I was angry, sad and empty 
(…), and overwhelmed by the feeling of being totally turned down. I had lost everything. It felt like 
mental rape. This happened four to five years ago, though I can still feel it all today. The emotions 
have become embedded inside me and will always remain with me. (woman, age 38) 
I was medicated by depot injection, but the way they did it was wrong. I didn't want the medicine. 
Four-five people were in the room. One gave the injection, while the others held me. I resisted. I was 
afraid. After this, they all left. I was alone. Later, I didn't want contact with the staff at all. I hid 
under the bedspread. Medication was the only physical contact I experienced during the stay. I think I 
needed the medicines. That was not the problem. After having been medicated several times, one 
person sat down at the bedside. This was a help of course, but all my bad feelings were still there. 
(woman, age 32) 
I was confined and did not want to get out of bed. I was punished with no more cigarettes. They took 
away all I had and locked me into a room for three days. That weekend it was my birthday. (man, age 37) 
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Several times they have given or taken away medicines without telling me what was going on. (man, 
age 37) 
I was given a wrong diagnosis. I wasn't believed when I told about my problem and was “stored 
away” in a nursing home in the countryside. The doctor told me that I would never recover and that 
this would be my home forever. But I met one person who understood that something was wrong. She 
was unskilled at that time, but she listened to me, encouraged and supported me, and helped me get 
away from that place. Today I have been taken off the sick list; I no longer take any medicines, live in 
my own house, work as a volunteer and study at the university. (woman, age 64) 
It is difficult to talk about what I have experienced. When my third child was born, my husband was a 
psychiatric patient and sterilization was forced on me. The child died after five weeks. I didn't get 
help, but I became ill because of the bereavement and was sent to the hospital. The hospital 
contributed to furthering my mental problems. I have struggled a lot with this, and feel that the 
system does not believe in me. (woman, age 67) 
Even if these stories represent only a small part of the narratives pertaining to humiliating 
experiences that infringe on clients' rights, the documentation is dramatic. The informants 
talk about situations in which the service system contributes further harm and trauma to the 
clients. Many stories are marked by an instrumental attitude to the service users and 
describe actions that can hardly be understood if they are not motivated by outdated views 
and the stigmatization of mental health clients, who tell about how their voices, feelings and 
opinions are of minor importance. Some of the episodes happened years ago, while others 
are quite new. But even if some experiences may belong to the past, the “victims” still fight 
with the aftermath of stigmatizing attitudes. Lawyers have underscored that encroachment 
in a person's private life demands treatment and recovery programmes of the highest 
quality (Syse & Nilstun, 1997). As long as this quality does not exist, then the right to 
intervene dramatically into people's lives must be questioned. Commitment and forced 
medication are often described by clients as being an extreme and often disabling 
experience. When we read clients' stories, we also get the impression that such actions are 
directed towards the stereotype of a mentally ill person and not at one who tells a detailed, 
thoughtful and emotional story. Several studies carried out in recent years show that there is 
little difference between the attitudes of the general public and psychiatrists towards people 
with mental health problems (Lauber et al., 2006). The studies even indicate that 
psychiatrists have more of a negative stereotypical view than the general public or other 
mental health professionals. The lack of responsiveness to clients' voices emerges as a major 
problem, thus causing reasons for concern regarding the protection of human rights for 
mental health clients. 
5. Humanistic and contextual approaches 
A humanistic perspective has both an ethical and scientific basis. Human beings live in a 
dimension of meaning that can primarily be experienced through dialogic relations. Dialogic 
relations are also fundamental for our existence and for a feeling of control and dignity, and 
because dialogic relations are fundamental, they cannot be rejected (Bachtin, 1997; 
Kirmayer, 1993; Sampson, 1993; Vetlesen & Nordtvedt, 1994; Wifstad, 1997). A humanistic 
perspective involves understanding emotional pain within both  an existential and 
contextual perspective, a perspective in which the picture of human experiences and 
relations are sustained in its social complexity, without being reduced to biological or intra-
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psychic mechanisms. Still, with a contextual perspective, one cannot claim a meta-
perspective. Whatever the position, efforts are needed to get into a dialogue with other 
positions, e.g. positions which are closer to the clinical field, with its more practical 
orientation and often acute problems that must be solved immediately. Of special interest 
here is how the positions of service users can be made more visible. Can researchers help? 
Maybe not, if we operate with absolute divisions between positions and only acknowledge 
knowledge obtained by personal experiences, although by such divisions, neither the users 
nor the professional’s position makes sense. No single person can cover the experiences of 
an entire group, as some ability to generalize from one’s own experiences must be taken for 
granted. We all have some kind of user experiences and a genuine, humanistic engagement 
can also help in understanding users’ experiences. At the same time, it is important to bear 
in mind that some experiences are so traumatic that it is difficult or impossible to believe in 
dialogue and constructive solutions. 
For ages, philosophers have discussed human beings’ abilities to handle existential fragility, 
loss and anxiety. Being a human being means to be exposed to uncontrollable and 
unforeseen events which necessarily disturb our souls and make anxiety an existential 
modus (Yalom, 1980; Nussbaum, 1994; Hall, 2000). Platonic and Aristotelian philosophers 
had different solutions to these dilemmas. Platonic philosophers recommended 
transcendence and withdrawal, while the Aristotelians emphasized that love and relations is 
what give meaning and happiness and that the challenge is “a robust embrace of the 
human” (Hall, 2000:179) which included love and close relations, as well as the natural 
anxiety about death and separation. After having reflected upon fundamental, universal 
existential questions, Martha Nussbaum points to the ability to reflect over these questions 
as therapy for anxiety and fragility that is naturally embedded in our human existence. With 
this reflection, she says that the fundamental choice between rejection or the embracing of 
our living conditions becomes clearer.  
Rollo May (1971) was one of the founders of humanistic psychology, and also focused on the 
ability to make fundamental choices based on a person’s own values. Humanistic 
psychology has its roots in existentialism and Rollo May stressed that human conditions 
such as loneliness and a feeling of lost meaning could only be handled if the person 
discovered his/her own values and became responsible for his/her own choices.  
Based on this way of thinking about emotional suffering, Hummelvoll (1997) has outlined 
the following principles for meetings with persons in crisis situations: Equality, mutuality, 
presence and acceptance, so that the person’s self respect is strengthened and his/her own 
solutions acknowledged, support in making responsible choices and in the search for 
meaning, coherence and hope, an openness in dealing with moral conflicts and feelings of 
guilt, and help in the process of gaining independence, freedom, honesty and a life based on 
one’s own values. These principles can also be seen as therapeutic guidelines. 
6. A real biopsycho-social model 
Through comprehensive review studies, Read et al. (2008) have provided a considerable 
contribution to the understanding of contextual factors, as well as illustrating that what is 
often seen as a genetically inherited vulnerability to stress can be acquired via adverse life 
events. As stated earlier by Zubin and Spring (1977), vulnerability can be acquired by 
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trauma experiences, specific diseases, perinatal complications, family experiences, 
adolescent peer interactions and other life events, although their description of a 
biopsychosocial model was either misunderstood or misused. According to Read et al. 
(2008), asking about one’s childhood and trying to understand the contextual meaning of 
symptoms has been outweighed by an approach that merely counts symptoms, gives the 
person a diagnosis and medication. This trend is clearly mirrored in research in which the 
focus on biological causes is on the rise. Out of 1,284 publications about childhood 
schizophrenia between 2000 and 2008, only five were related to child abuse and eight to 
poverty. The authors document how crucial factors such as child abuse and poverty really 
are, while revealing that poverty is even more strongly related to schizophrenia and 
psychosis than to other disorders. Based on the weighted average in 59 studies, the authors 
found that 64.5% of the women and 55% of the men had been subjected to either child 
sexual abuse or child physical abuse, with the combined rate at 60.02%. But estimating the 
prevalence of childhood maltreatment by using only child sexual or physical abuse as 
indicators leads to underestimation, as studies among first-episode schizophrenia spectrum 
inpatients also found that childhood emotional abuse mounted to 94 %, childhood 
emotional neglect to 89% and childhood physical neglect to 89%. Furthermore, studies of 
psychosis and schizophrenia have consistently found high rates of affectionless control 
parenting. There is also a pattern emerging in which the strongest relationships with abuse 
and neglect appear to be for hallucinations and the relationship between child abuse and 
hallucinations also exists across diagnostic boundaries.  
In 2005, a review based on four population studies and a myriad of other studies (Read et 
al., 2005) concluded that child abuse is a causal factor for psychosis and schizophrenia. In 
the media, the research was presented as something that could cause the psychiatric 
establishment to “experience an earthquake that will shake its intellectual foundations” 
(James, 2005). 
Since the 2005 review, seven more population-based studies have been published. The 2008 
review (Read et al., 2008) then built on 11 population-based studies by seven independent 
research teams, using nine different samples drawn from six countries. In all of the studies, 
higher levels of child maltreatment or neglect were found in the psychosis groups.  
The probability of a causal effect between child maltreatment or neglect and psychosis is 
increased if we find that the first not only predicts the second, but that more of the first – 
greater severity or frequency of abuse – is more related to the second, i.e. that there is a 
dose-response. The eight studies that investigated this dose-response hypothesis confirmed 
the hypothesis. According to the authors, it seems that the hypothesis that there is a specific 
genetic disposition for schizophrenia is turning out to be one of the costliest blind alleys in 
the history of medical research. This statement is supported by other researchers, e.g. 
example Hamilton (2008), who by then had conducted the most comprehensive genetic 
association study of genes. Hamilton wrote that “none of the polymorphisms were 
associated with the schizophrenia phenotype at a reasonable threshold for statistical 
significance” (Hamilton, 2008, p. 420) and that “The distribution of test statistics suggests 
nothing outside of what would be expected by chance” (Hamilton, 2008, p. 421). None of the 
researchers referred to by Read et al. (2008) argued that biological processes are irrelevant. 
There are biological processes underlying the mechanisms by which trauma leads to 
psychosis, and all mental processes have neurological and biochemical correlates, but even 
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if these correlates can be identified, we have not discovered a cause. Read et al. (2008) 
compare such an argument with assuming that because grief also causes reactions in the 
brain, it is the brain that causes the grief and sadness. In contrast to this, the Trauma 
Neurodevelopmental Model (TN) of psychosis says that changes in the brain such as 
overactivity of the HPA axis, dopamine, norephinephrine and serotonin abnormalities, 
ventricular enlargement, etc. happen because of the brain’s reaction to the environment. 
Biological differences found in the brains of persons with psychosis are also found in the 
brains of abused children, which is a finding that supports the theory that a heightened 
sensitivity to stress as traced in the brain’s stress regulation mechanisms can be caused by 
childhood trauma. 
This documentation implies that psychosis can be prevented. If child abuse is a causal factor 
for psychosis to the same extent as with other psychological problems, the authors then 
argue that the same primary prevention programmes that work for other problems will also 
work for psychosis. It is about keeping children safe and supporting families. 
Another gain from accepting this well documented theory is that persons with diagnoses 
that say they have schizophrenia or psychosis are not seen as being genuinely different 
from “us”, which is essential when it comes to a discussion about human rights for 
persons under mental health care. An important question is whether their disabilities 
qualify for treatment according to a special law and exemptions from the European 
Convention on Human Rights - indicating reduced decision capacity - or should they 
enjoy the same rights and freedoms as other groups in society when they need assistance 
from the health service systems? 
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which was signed in 
2006, builds on a social model which says that disabilities are the result of an interaction 
between an individual and barriers in a society. Therefore, the convention also adopts a 
human rights and social model for disabilities, including mental disabilities, as underscored 
by the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights. This new model also means a new legal 
position for mental health clients. As we shall see in the next paragraph, the CRPD states 
that all health care must be based on a free and informed consent. 
7. Signs of a paradigmatic shift 
After the CRPD was signed, 20 countries soon ratified the convention so that it could also be 
ratified as an international convention. As of 2011, approximately 100 countries had ratified, 
thus allowing mental disabilities to be included on equal basis with other disabilities. The 
convention states that “persons with disabilities enjoy equal capacity on an equal basis with others 
in all aspects of life” (Art. 12). It further states that health care shall be of the same quality for 
persons with disabilities as it is for others, “including on the basis of free and informed consent” 
(Art. 25). 
The CRPD takes the legal protection of mental health clients a step further in relation to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) from 1950, in which exceptions could be 
made for mental health clients, depending on medical judgments. It seems as if the time is 
now ripe for the European Court to take a more independent attitude towards medical 
judgments in the mental health care system, which is supported by the CRPD. 
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As stated by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to enjoy the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health (Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the right of everyone.. 2005): “The Mental Illness Principles recognize that no treatment shall be 
given without informed consent. This is consistent with fundamental tenets of international human 
rights law, such as the autonomy of the individual. But this core provision in the Principles is subject 
to extensive exceptions and qualifications. (…) in practice their combined effect tends to render the 
right of informed consent almost meaningless.”  
The CRPD was developed from the insight that the human rights of people with disabilities 
in many areas still have a weaker protection then the rights of other groups. The main 
objective of the convention is to prevent discrimination against people with disabilities, 
while also moving away from a model in which disabilities are seen as something 
individual - and people with disabilities as objects for medical and other interventions - to a 
model and practice in which all people have dignity and human rights on equal basis with 
other human beings. The CRPD substitutes the medical model with a social and human 
rights model (Orefellen, 2011). The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) supports this point of view: “First the Convention recognizes that 
disabilities are the result of interaction between an individual with impairment and the physical, 
attitudinal and other barriers in society. The medical and charity model is completely abandoned in 
favour of a human rights and social model” (OHCHR, 2007). 
The OHCHR also emphasizes the legal capacity of persons with disabilities: “Article 12 of the 
Convention requires States parties to recognize persons with disabilities as individuals before the law, 
possessing legal capacity, including the capacity to act, on an equal basis with others” (OHCHR, 
2009), and further says: “The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) states 
clearly that deprivation of liberty based on the existence of a disability is contrary to international 
human rights law, is intrinsically discriminatory, and is therefore unlawful. Such unlawfulness also 
extends to situations where additional grounds—such as the need for care, treatment and the safety of 
the person or the community—are used to justify deprivation of liberty. 
Under international human rights law, persons with disabilities are entitled to enjoy their rights to 
liberty and security on an equal basis with others, and can be lawfully deprived of their liberty only 
for the reasons, and in accordance with the procedures, that are applicable to other persons in the 
same jurisdiction” (OHCHR, 2008a). This citation also implies that crime is crime irrespective 
of diagnoses and disabilities, and that the judicial system and the health care system should 
not be mixed. The point is made clear in the following paragraphs: 
“(…)Where additional grounds such as dangerousness, (…) are put forward to justify the restriction 
of liberty of a person with a mental and intellectual disability, such a person shall be subjected to 
detention on such grounds only in as much and on the same grounds as any other person, with no 
reference to his or her mental or intellectual condition” (OHCHR, 2008b). 
“Laws contemplating dangerousness as a ground for deprivation of liberty should be equally applied 
to all” (OHCHR, 2007). 
Article 12 seems to not open up for a reduced legal capacity or exemptions in any case, 
whether serious disabilities or comprehensive needs for help. (Orefellen, 2011). Instead, the 
CRPD builds on a model in which persons with disabilities should be ensured of getting the 
needed support in order to make decisions: “This year as we focus on the right to act, let us 
recognize all people's right to make their own choices, and take their own actions as they see fit. 
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Whenever people with disabilities need assistance they should be supported by people of their own free 
choice in making decisions, but never replaced in their legal capacity to act under no circumstance” 
(CRPD –committee, 2009c). 
To ensure full inclusion and equal rights, it is necessary to tear down physical, judicial and 
other barriers that particularly affect people with disabilities, and to offer assistance in such 
a way that fundamental rights can be enjoyed on an equal basis with other groups. This 
implies a rethinking of both practice and legislation, which also demands comprehensive 
processes of increasing awareness (Orefellen, 2011). 
The fundamental principles in the CRPD convention are dignity, autonomy, the freedom to 
make one’s own choices, equality and non-discrimination, which also implies that 
institutionalization without a person’s free and informed consent must be abolished:  
“Legislation authorizing the institutionalization of persons with disabilities on the grounds of their 
disability without their free and informed consent must be abolished. This must include the repeal of 
provisions authorizing institutionalization of persons with disabilities for their care and treatment 
without their free and informed consent, as well as provisions authorizing the preventive detention of 
persons with disabilities on grounds such as the likelihood of them posing a danger to themselves or 
others, in all cases in which such grounds of care, treatment and public security are linked in 
legislation to an apparent or diagnosed mental illness” (OHCHR, 2009). 
Additionally, Article 17 of the CRPD, which is about the right to respect in relation to 
physical and mental integrity for all peoples, including persons with disabilities, seems to be 
important in regard to coercive treatment in psychiatric and mental health care. When the 
CRPD committee examined Tunisia in April of 2011, Article 17’s “Protecting the integrity of 
persons” was included in the “List of issues”, and Tunisia was asked to document 
legislation that protects persons with disabilities from medical experiments and treatment 
without their free and informed consent, as well as outlining arrangements which will 
ensure that persons are not exposed to mechanically coercive means and coercive treatment 
in mental health care (CRPD, 2010b; Orefellen, 2011). 
Serious infringements that would normally be classified as mistreatment in mental health 
care could be redefined as “necessary” health care, which is seen as a problem under the 
new paradigm that the CRPD represents: 
“Medical treatments of an intrusive and irreversible nature, when they (…) aim at correcting or 
alleviating a disability, may constitute torture and ill-treatment if enforced or administered without 
the free and informed consent of the person concerned.” 
“The administration in detention and psychiatric institutions of drugs, including neuroleptics that 
cause trembling, shivering and contractions and make the subject apathetic and dull his or her 
intelligence, has been recognized as a form of torture.” 
“The Special Rapporteur notes that forced and non-consensual administration of psychiatric drugs, 
and in particular of neuroleptics, for the treatment of a mental condition needs to be closely 
scrutinized. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the suffering inflicted and the effects upon 
the individual’s health may constitute a form of torture or ill-treatment” (SRT, UN special 
Rapporteur on Torture, 2008). 
The Human Rights Council (2009) has underscored that there are no exemptions from the 
articles that protect people against the deprivation of liberty:  
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“Prior to the entrance into force of the Convention, the existence of a mental disability represented a 
lawful ground for deprivation of liberty and detention under international human rights law. The 
Convention radically departs from this approach by forbidding deprivation of liberty based on the 
existence of any disability, including mental or intellectual, as discriminatory.” 
8. The possibility of change 
According to Kuhn (1970), Paradigmatic shifts take place when scientific discipline is 
thrown into a crisis. There have been several discussions over both the concept paradigm 
and paradigm shifts. New theories and ideas should be very comprehensive in order to 
qualify for the term, paradigm shift. Kuhn wrote that paradigm shifts usually happen via 
revolution and that the language and theories of various paradigms are incommensurable, 
though of course it can be doubted as to whether languages or theories can be 
incommensurable with one another.  
In relation to psychiatric and mental health care, it is difficult to estimate as to what 
degree fundamental changes will take place and if so, whether the changes qualify for a 
paradigm shift, i.e. if there really is a scientific revolution taking place. Arguments in 
favour of the position that fundamental changes will come are the long-lasting tensions 
between a medical and psychosocial discourse, the unsuccessful attempts at documenting 
the existence of genetic and biological markers, the dark side of history as represented by 
very negative and painful user experiences over the centuries, the humanistic and 
successful alternatives outlined, and not least, the international ratification of the 
Convention on the Rights of Peoples with Disabilities, which is based on an international 
consensus about the need for substituting the medical and charity model with a human 
rights and social model. 
What we are also seeing now is an intellectual battle between the followers of the different 
“paradigms”. It seems as if this will not result in any reconciliation between the two main 
approaches. Arguments and documentation in favour of an approach at odds with 
mainstream professional thinking are not easily integrated into existing models. The 
documentation can be registered, but neglected when it comes to policymaking, which is 
what seems to have occurred in the Norwegian, government-appointed group, whose 
mandate it was to give a report on legislation related to coercive treatment in mental health 
care (NOU, 2011:9); acknowledging the weak, and at the same time often harmful effects of 
psychotropic drugs, but still allowing forced medication. 
That there may be sudden changes instead of a rational and controlled process based on 
evidence and scientific documentation is indicated by the former lead editor of DSM-IV, 
Allan Frances. Frances, who earlier did not want to be “a crusader of the world”, said in an 
interview in 2010 that ,“The idea of more kids getting unneeded antipsychotics that would 
make them gain 12 pounds in 12 weeks hit me in the gut. It was uniquely my job and my 
duty to protect them. If not me to correct it, who? I was stuck without an excuse to convince 
myself” (Interviewed by Gary Greenberg for Wired, December 27, 2010; published January 
2011). Frances fears that by use of the proposed diagnostic category, “psychosis risk 
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There is no doubt that the mainstream thinking in psychiatric and mental health care is 
challenged from different sides and that changes will come, though in what way and how 
comprehensive are not easy to predict. Thus, we are facing exciting times. 
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